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Introduction
António de Almeida Mendes and Clément Thibaud
1  At  the  junction  between  modern  and  contemporary  history,  this  dossier  is  an
opportunity  to  reflect  on  an  improbable  intersection  between  two  ostensibly
contradictory notions: slavery and citizenship. This contrast concerns, of course, the
period of Western abolitions of slavery in the European empires, between the end of
the 18th century and the end of the 19th century, but one of the challenges of the
articles presented herein is precisely to destabilize this chronology. Would the notion
of counter-citizenship help us to understand this tension over the long term (la longue
durée)? Certainly, the concept is undoubtedly as counter-intuitive as the realities it is
supposed to reflect, but it could nevertheless enable us to address the unthinkable: the
social and political forms of ambiguous, even paradoxical, inclusion of enslaved people
and groups, both during the abolitionist moment and before and after it, given the fact
that the prohibition of slavery as an institution did not end the strong dependency of
the descendants of the enslaved people. Counter-citizenship makes it possible to reflect
on the many experiences that have marked not only the transition from the condition
of slave to that of citizen, but also the ambiguous situations in which they may, on
occasion,  have  overlapped.  This  notion  could  thus  designate  two  intertwined
dimensions of the identity of discriminated groups. First, it would describe the process
by which individual or collective actors, kept at the edge of the communities where
they live, strive to acquire signs of social recognition and rights to act or take action in
society. In turn, these alternative forms of citizenship would affect the definition of
“that  which  makes  for  common  ground”  in  a  given  society.  With  considerable
variations in time and space,  slaves,  freedmen and freedwomen,  or  free persons of
color,  also  had  their  own  conceptions  of  the  polis,  the  city,  and  emphasized  these
through both words and actions.
2  In writings dating back to the 17th century, and embracing examples located in the
Caribbean and Hispanic-American regions, passing through West Africa and India, the
angle chosen thus addresses a paradox or, at the very least, a tension. Citizenship is, by
definition, the very opposite of the condition of slavery. It appears to be commonly
attached to places and times, those of “political modernity,” which emerged in the age




way of establishing society, based on a social contract that guarantees individual rights
and based on the values of equality and freedom. This is not precisely the case of the
slave, whom all revolutionary rhetoric refers to as the antonym of the citizen. A slave,
at that time by definition, according to Roman law, was an “animated thing,” i.e. an
object devoid of any rights by nature. The enslaved embodied a humanity foreclosed
upon by the new community of equals.  Slave represented a monstrous singularity—
both for us and for some contemporaries—in how they were viewed by new normative
constructions emerging with the revolutions and independences in the Euro-American
world. However, for a long time now, this counterpoint between slave and citizen has
been shown to be less cut and dry than previously evidenced. The servile condition did
not prevent certain individuals or collective actors, established in this condition, from
participating, within very precise limits, in collective life, especially if they lived in the
city,  having  escaped  the  plantation.  In  the  Iberian  world,  enslaved  were  baptized,
participated in religious life, could marry, associate in brotherhoods, pursue their own
interests. Some presented complaints to the courts and could, if necessary, have their
master convicted. While the appalling harshness of the enslaved living conditions must
never be trivialized —as it was in the golden legend recounted by the historian Gilberto
Freyre in the 20th century — the fact remains that these particular coordinates must be
taken into account in order to better understand how the escape from slavery and the
passage  to  freedom,  still  partial  for  many  heirs  of  this  history,  towards  full  and
complete accession to citizenship and participation in the life of the city took place.
This is precisely what Ahmadou Séhou’s article discusses.
3  The  five  texts  that  make  up  this  dossier  combine  historical  density,  geographical
diversity  and a  plurality  of  approaches.  This  triple  orientation invites  us  to  situate
ourselves in the longue durée of speeches, representations and practices associated with
the theoretically unnatural articulation between slavery and citizenship. Placed in a
situation of domination, enslaved and freedmen and women played a decisive role from
the very beginning of colonization in the course of how their legal situation evolved,
through  attitudes  that  oscillated  between  resistance  to  the  slavery  system  and
assimilation  of  the  values  and culture  that  governed their  daily  lives  in  a  colonial
situation.  Political  and social  measures were introduced at  the time of  the Atlantic
abolitions to enable former enslaved to have local access to freedom and civil and legal
equality. These measures resulted in the reaffirmation of social and statutory control
measures designed to enshrine former enslaved in systems of obligations, dependencies
and racial hierarchies supposedly compatible with often abstract principles of equality.
If the counterpoint between citizenship and slavery actually hides superimpositions, it
is also because the definition of the first term is not as clear-cut as we usually believe. If
we  refuse  to  identify  the  citizen  with  his  contemporary,  revolutionary  and  post-
revolutionary definition, we can restore its proper temporality. In the vein opened by
Tamar Herzog, Ancien Régime citizenship must be linked to a spectrum of social values
and practices rather than to a political definition, linked to national belonging, or to
the  possession  and  exercise  of  constitutional  rights.  This  concrete  citizenship—
sensitive to the qualities and attributes of individuals such as honor, reputation, family
status, lineage,—probably excluded enslaved from the circle of recognized community
members.  Nevertheless,  it  defined  more  a  spectrum  of  possibilities  than  a  binary
integration  modality,  open  or  closed.  This  is  why  individuals  without  rights  could




explore the complexity of these social  processes,  both in relation to major political
upheavals and in everyday life.
4  These remarks apply  particularly  to  Iberian slave societies,  which are  addressed in
Rodrigo Salomón Pérez Hernández’s articles on 17th century New Spain and Thomas
Mareite’s articles on independences Chile. These societies have singularities that make
it easier to see the intertwining of citizenship and counter-citizenship. Iberian slave
societies were early and long-lasting examples of this for a number of reasons: first of
all, with the establishment of the Atlantic and transatlantic slave trade networks by the
Portuguese in the 15th and 16th centuries; their links with the construction of complex
societies in island areas, on the African coasts, and then in the Americas where the
mixed race and the free of color very quickly represented a very large proportion of the
population; their truly Atlantic and global character, since both Portugal and Castile
sheltered large populations of slaves on metropolitan soil—the former, in particular,
controlled  large  areas  on  the  African  continent,  perfectly  linked  to  the  Brazilian
provinces—and finally, their longevity, since the Iberians were the first to invent the
sugar plantation and the last to abolish slavery in Cuba in 1886 and in Brazil in 1888. It
is therefore not surprising that this particular history conditioned both certain types of
integration and social exclusion of slaves and shaped the process of their liberation
during the 19th century.
5  In both Hispanic America and Brazil, the descendants of Africans were considered to be
foreigners, since their ancestors came from lands outside the two monarchies. Both the
Spanish Charter of Cadiz (1812) and the first Brazilian Constitution (1824) kept records
of this, the first by excluding the descendants of Africans from citizenship because of
the birth of their ancestors outside the lands of the Catholic monarchy, the second by
reserving political rights only to those who were freed and born in Brazil. Nonetheless,
many emancipated enslaved, or their descendants, had thus gained local recognition as
early as the 17th century, as Rodrigo Salomón Pérez Hernández1 shows, and had made
this  publicly  clear,  for  example,  by  earning  military  rank,  obtaining  stripes,  and
sometimes the épaulette,  in urban militias. Thus defined, citizenship was acquired in
degrees, sometimes through strategies deployed over generations. It had to overcome
the racial stigma associated with blood impurity attributable to the real or supposed
servile condition of the ancestors. It is against this background, which is also known as
“race  passing,”  that  so-called  modern  citizenship,  with  its  electoral  and  legal
translation,  was  built,  leaving  it  with  a  concrete  dimension,  in  which  race  would
certainly play an important, but not always primary role, as Jean Hébrard suggests in
the case of Saint-Domingue after the abolition of 1793. Race, as a devaluing criterion of
social classification, linking body and temporality, hindered access to full recognition
of  citizenship,  both  before  and  after  the  revolutionary  triumph  of  abolitionist
repertoires,  whether  religious,  liberal  or  republican,  in  the  first  half  of  the  19th
century.
6  This  is  what  Rodrigo  Salomón  Pérez  Hernández’s  article  brilliantly  shows  us  by
presenting an extraordinary but isolated case, that of the mulatto enslaved Miguel de la
Flor. Born in Oaxaca, New Spain, this individual did not correspond well to what his
servile condition, the color of his skin, his “infamous” birth to a slave mother, would
suggest. The inquisition trial established against him reminds us that he knew Latin,
claimed to be a poet, was a reader and scholar, gambled and drew in his spare time,




integrated into urban social life, this slave was hardly like his fellow slaves who worked
in haciendas and mines. We see that the servile condition concealed a set of very diverse
social positions that brought some individuals closer to the status of vecino, despite the
servile  macule,  while  others  remained  left  to  the  arbitrariness  of  the  masters  and
subjected to strenuous work.
7  Much later, in the 19th century, the abolition of slavery raised the question of the fate
of the freedmen and freedwomen and their descendants. The history of the citizenship
of the “free of color,” since their position was indissolubly linked to that of slaves, even
at several generations’ distance, was far from linear. This dossier invites us then to
ponder  these  vicissitudes  and  sinuous  paths  to  emancipation  and  citizenship  by
questioning the liberating role of the abolitionist moment, including a focus on the
centrality of its chronology. It is also because of the intensity of the transatlantic slave
trade to Cuba and Brazil—a trade that was made illegal by the Congress of Vienna in
1815—that the era of the abolitions, together with the era of the Atlantic revolutions
and Ibero-American independences, was contemporaneous with a surge in the slave
trade and slave plantation economy. Thomas Mareite’s fine article thus invites us not to
consider  the  period  from  the  Enlightenment  to  the  last  Iberian  emancipations  (as
mentioned, as late as these were) as a necessary, teleologically inscribed process in the
liberal or republican constitutional repertoires that the Americas and the Caribbean
adopted  from  the  late  18th  century  to  the  early  19th  century  to  found  their
independent nations. By emancipating themselves from European control, the latter
did not necessarily intend to put an end to slavery. As Claude-Olivier Doron pointed
out,  despite  their  universalist  principles,  the  ideological  registers  of  liberalism  or
republicanism have, on the contrary, been able to shelter new racial ideologies that
justify the maintenance of slavery. This is also true of the first republican leaders of
Chile. Here, as elsewhere, the involvement of enslaved in the military was a much more
operative factor than ideologies—which should not be neglected—in the process that
would weaken the institution of slavery in Hispanic America. However, slaves, born and
raised in the shadow of the tutelage of masters who were themselves accustomed to the
“yoke  of  Iberian  despotism,”  could  not  become  citizens  without  a  long  process  of
regeneration.  This  was  the  argument  put  forward  by  the  Republicans  to  postpone
immediate emancipation, while voting for gradual abolition, and thereby creating new
forms of dependence that deprived the liberated of their rights as citizens.
8  Jean Hébrard’s article shows in a new light the functioning of the slave society of Saint-
Domingue during the Haitian Revolution. The multiple individual statuses that made up
this society and the relationships between colonial subjects must be analyzed from the
perspective of both the framework of slavery and especially in the light of the social,
religious and legal structures that shaped the societies of the Ancien Régime over the
long term. The critical and rigorous analysis of documentation produced by the State
and the Church in the Catholic empires also highlights the choices made by individuals
to integrate into the social and political life of the colony, to make their wishes heard
and the strategies they adopted. It also highlights the complexity of the relationship
between whites and people of color, and the subjectivity of the notion of freedom. In
Saint-Domingue, the first name tells much more than one would think about who gave
it, when and where, the “state,” the “condition,” the “status” of an individual and his/
her descendants. The Church, continued, during and after the revolutionary upheaval,
to act as guardian of civil status, making baptism the naming place which defined a




child was declared and reported to the civil registrar. The first name and surname sign
the social destiny of an individual, tightly restricted by both family history and major
public institutions. The cases studied by Jean Hébrard show that the first names given
to an individual are as important as ancestry, lineage or professional activity in placing
the descendants of enslaved in categories of dependency: associated with a discourse
on social “order,” these have maintained the illusion of an unchanging society. The
continued reference to “order” and respect for tradition limited the rights of former
enslaved who were thus placed in a situation of servitude and prevented from enjoying
many rights to which they would otherwise be entitled.
9  Likewise, in many African societies, slavery has long been associated with the slavery of
traditions, practices that are part of a natural order that has always organized societies.
Ahmadou Séhou’s study on the lamidats, chieftainship slaves of Adamaoua, in northern
Cameroon, shows in a remarkable way how slavery-like practices and discourses have
survived the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. The transmission of a servile status
through heredity and the persistence of a servile stigma that is inscribed in the “blood”
remain important  factors  in  the  construction of  identity  and in  the distribution of
social and economic functions within society. The terms that continue to be used to
designate the descendants of enslaved create an impassable gap between the free man
by birth and the freedman. This slavery, which could be described as metaphorical,
strongly stigmatizes the descendants of enslaved in public life and builds hierarchies
based  on  birth.  Embedded  in  the  long-term  and  complex  nature  of  human
relationships,  these  birth-based  hierarchies  are  difficult  to  eradicate,  including  by
members of dominated social groups who eventually assume this subordinate social
and economic status.
10  Here we touch on another aspect of “counter-citizenship,” this time, a negative one.
Casting a shadow over civil and political citizenship, counter-citizenship reveals a more
or less hidden stigma that some groups of individuals bear. In Africa, as elsewhere,
universalist  modernity  has  not  erased  this  underground  history,  which,  under  the
Ancien Régime, as nowadays, marks the—real or supposed—descendants of slaves.
11  As Harsch Mander, Indrajit Roy, Priyanka Jain and alii show, the liberalization of the
Indian  labor  market  since  the  1990s  has  produced  significant  economic  and  social
changes. It has helped to redesign migration practices in response to labor needs and to
the development of circular and seasonal migration in particular. The persistence of
many exceptions to free employment and the reappearance of contemporary forms of
enslavement,  of  neoslavery,  raise the question of the status of  these new practices.
They are much the vestige of a traditional organization, of a “refeudalization” of the
labor market, as they are the mark of new forms of work placements into a modern
capitalist model. All of this speaks to the unfortunate present-day pertinence of the
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